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ABSTRACT
China and India - Asia’s two great civilisational states - are also the world’s
most populous, accounting between them for a third of humanity. Both nations
are nuclear armed and developing blue water navies. In view of their
widespread material poverty, however, neither can be considered a truly great
power, not even China whose permanent membership of the UN Security
Council confers international influence beyond its economic and strategic
reach. Nonetheless, China holds advantages over India in the global perception
of power, and it is this perception which contributes to the exercise of power.
Chinese military ambition (as distinct from capability), the strength of Chinese
culture, and the much touted market of a billion people, have captivated the
global imagination. Even China’s critics are at their harshest when discussing
human rights issues, Tibet and Taiwan. India, by comparison, has not
commanded international influence by virtue of being the world’s biggest
democracy or having a strong computer software industry. Acquisition of
nuclear weapons has yet to be translated into genuine power, but rather is seen
as evidence of ‘gung-ho’ behaviour.
In short, where China is perhaps unreasonably feared, given its lack of
capability or even sufficiently demonstrated intent, India is not feared enough.
And while that famed European Renaissance strategist, Nicholi Machiavelli,
thought it better to be both loved and feared, he recognised both do not always
coincide, and that human experience has taught that it is safer to be feared in an
unsafe world. Neither China nor India are sufficiently appreciated for their
inherent capacities. China’s are exaggerated in the wrong direction; in China,
whatever the appearance, power no longer grows out of the barrel of a gun.
Indeed, the military is among the least of China’s assets - unless it is deployed to
extramilitary ends - and can be among its worst enemies if it is not. As for
India’s capacities, they are underestimated in terms of their diversionary
power; it is a case of watch what India says, not what it does. What is India
saying it is doing? Interpreting India, and hence its potentialities, is perhaps
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even more important than interpreting China which is, ironically for a
relatively secretive polity, more revealing of itself.
This paper engages in an exploration of the possibilities of new mandalas - or
schemas - of power in 21st century geopolitics. The title draws from Indian
political tradition (the raj-mandala of Kautilya) as well as Chinese mandala
formations during the Middle Kingdom’s height of power. The return of the
mandala to statecraft in the 21st century is a fitting tribute to the power of Asian
states in transforming, albeit by largely indirect means, the political landscape.
The use of mandala in this paper is not directly Kautilyan, but a significantly
modified concept to account for 21st century geostrategic conditions. The new
mandalas of power are pertinent explorations of the conference theme in its
concern for regional relations across the hemisphere: ‘Small and mid-great
powers in southern hemisphere and their relations with northern neighbours’.
A mandala with a southern sector viewpoint permits a more dispassionate
appraisal of northern sector activity. It is easier to delineate the effects of China
and India, on each other and on others, when one is not China and India. It is
enough, as the Thais would traditionally say, to be near.
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China and India:
New Mandalas of Power in 21st Century Geopolitics
by
Rosita Dellios
I INTRODUCTION: 21ST CENTURY MANDALAS OF POWER
A mandala - meaning circle in Sanskrit - is a mystic diagram representing the
cosmos. Composed of circles, squares and sometimes other geometrical shapes,
it looks like a palace floorplan with gates from the outer to the inner chamber
where the monarch is enthroned. In Buddhism and Hinduism is it used as a
meditational aid to reach a higher state of consciousness. One needs to progress
through such human causes of suffering as selfishness, greed, ignorance and
intolerance, before entering higher states of being as one centres. Besides its
spiritual meaning, the mandala is also a geopolitical expression to describe the
conduct of relationships of power among ancient kingdoms in India and later
in Hinduised Southeast Asia (see, for example, Dellios, 1997a, 1997b, 1999).
These two meanings are not necessarily mutually exclusive, particularly in the
present age when moral and material power are pursued simultaneously.
The present world mandala is largely American-inspired but two emerging
regional mandalas are those of China and India. Both have sizable continental
and maritime dimensions, generally unchallenged except where they meet in
the trans-Himalayan and Ganges-Mekong sectors. The mountain sector is less
volatile than the water domain further south, where each comes face to face
with the other’s traditional spheres of influence and vulnerability to invasion. If
India expands its influence into the South China Sea via Indochina,1 and
likewise China does so into the Indian Ocean via Burma,2 instability is likely to
arise if this is perceived as a negation of the values of the retreating power, and
hence loss of its ‘charismatic’ attraction.3
In the 21st century, both China and India represent great cultural nations that
are endeavouring to become great political powers. They must do this within
the prevailing conditions of global connectivity and competitiveness in the
1 In November 2000, India formed a formal grouping with five Southeast Asian countries for
cooperation in culture, education, human resources and other areas, called the Ganges-Mekong
Cooperation Organisation.
2 Burma is widely viewed as a client state of China. See, for example, International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 2000a.
3 Traditional geopolitical mandalas were based on the politics of a charismatic centre, with its
attraction of “deference and obligations” from other power centres through a demonstrated
“ability to win allies and overtake enemies” (Higham, 1989:240).
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knowledge industry, and not only by traditional means of a strong armed force
and economy. While respecting the sovereign equality of states, they are not
likely to settle for ‘middle power’ status, except in terms of a temporary
hardship. India is already distinguished as “a high-tech leader, with the second
largest computer software industry, the largest being in the US” (Sheridan,
2000). China, in having succeeded in joining the WTO in 2001, can better access
global markets while profiting from the benefits of competition in its own
market. With progress in these and other related areas already underway, it is
well within the realms of speculation to anticipate new mandalas - or schemas -
of power in 21st century geopolitics, based on the Chinese and Indian power
centres. The language and signification of mandala, drawn from Indian political
tradition (the raj-mandala of Kautilya) as well as Chinese mandala formations
during the Middle Kingdom’s height of power in dynastic times, is a fitting
device for providing a culturally regional perspective. The use of mandala here
is not directly Kautilyan, but a significantly modified concept to account for
21st century geostrategic conditions.
II THE NARRATIVE OF POWER AS IT TRAVELS EAST FROM
WESTERN GATEWAYS
China and the India - Asia’s two great civilisational states - are also the world’s
most populous nations. Their combined populations of 2.3 billion represent a
third of humankind. They are among the poorest of people with per capita
GNP, for many, at below US$200. In view of their widespread material poverty,
neither country can be considered a truly great power, not even China whose
permanent membership of the UN Security Council confers international
influence beyond its economic and strategic reach. As Lee Kuan Yew,
Singapore’s respected senior minister, once remarked: “At present [1997], when
people refer to China as a great power, it is more diplomatic courtesy than
reality” (Richardson, 1997).
Perception of power and the power of perception
More pointed has been the appraisal of the late Gerald Segal, acerbic analyst of
Chinese power and former director of studies at London’s influential
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Writing in Foreign Affairs in
1999, under the telling title of ‘Does China Matter?’, he found that the Middle
Kingdom was really only a middle power (Segal, 1999). Applauding China for
its theatrical performance in convincing the world of its illusionary power,
Segal concluded that the statistics of power - both economic and military - did
not support the perception of China as great. “Beijing is a seriously overrated
power,” he claimed. “China made up a mere 3 percent of total world trade in
1997, about the same as South Korea and less than the Netherlands” (p. 26). He
also singled out Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into China as another myth
which did not withstand statistical scrutiny, in that China accounted for only
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about 10 percent of global FDI (p. 28). As to China’s military credentials, these
he dismissed as “second-rate”:
. . . China is a second-rate military power - not first-rate, because it is far from
capable of taking on America, but not as third-rate as most of its Asian neighbours.
China accounts for only 4.5 percent of global defense spending (the United States
makes up 33.9 percent) and 25.8 percent of defense spending in East Asia and
Australasia. (p. 29)
While Segal’s statistically-backed arguments are plausible, so are those in
support of China’s greatness. Illustrative is a speech to Beijing University in the
same year cited above, 1997, by the then director-general of the World Trade
Organisation (WTO), Renato Ruggiero. He spoke of “the reality that China is
already a leading power in an ever more interdependent global economy”, and
went on the provide supporting evidence:
This reality is emphasized by the sheer force of China’s rise in the world. During the
last decade, output has been expanding by an average of 10 per cent a year, while
merchandise export volume has been growing even faster, at about 15 per cent. In
two decades, the value of China’s merchandise exports has expanded more than
twenty-fold, reaching US$151 billion last year. China is already the world’s fifth
largest trading power, and the second largest recipient of foreign investment. Today
the Chinese economy represents between 5 to 10 per cent of global output,
depending on the method used to calculate national production. (Ruggiero, 1997)
While there is some disparity in the statistics cited by an academic of
international repute and an equally reputable trade organisation director, for a
range of reasons,4 there is no doubt that each of these influential commentators
4 These reasons may include methodology of calculation, the inclusion or exclusion of Hong
Kong, the reliability of China’s state-issued statistics, or even the authenticity of FDI data. With
regard to the first, a better known alternative method of calculation is ‘purchasing power parity’
(PPP). Its acceptance is reflected in its inclusion the the World Bank’s ‘World Development
Indicators’. Thus PPP GNP is defined as “gross national product converted to international
dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same puychasing
power over GNP as a U.S. dollar has in the United States” (World Bank, 2000). Or, as the East
Asia Analytical Unit (1996:111) elaborates, PPP “refers to a method of comparing the size of
economies using international price comparisons to reflect the relative domestic purchasing
powers of currencies. Traditional ways . . . simply convert national figures on the size of a given
economy, expressed in the local currency, to foreign exchange (usually US dollars) at the
prevailing official exchange rate. This method has well-known shortcomings, including the fact
that prices of services and other non-traded goods tend to be much lower in developing
economies. As a result, PPP measures of developing economies are frequently higher than
estimates based on exchange-rate calculations.” With regard to the second reason for statistical
sources of difference, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the PRC functions as a
separate Customs territory and hence does not automatically come under PRC trade figures.
Complicating the matter further, however, is the conduct of a proportion of Chinese trade
through Hong Kong. Under careful analysis, this can be discerned through China’s Customs
Statistics (see EAAU, 1996:145). As to reliability of China’s statistical data, the fourth reason
noted above, even the central government might be mislead by enterprises seeking to
exaggerate their productivity to avoid being targeted for reform. Finally, the questionable
authenticity of FDI data derives from Chinese mainland investments sometimes being disguised
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was more concerned with perception of power. Each had an argument to make,
and it mattered not whether a country which was responsible for (only) three
percent of world trade was the equivalent of the world’s fifth largest trading
power. What did matter was the light in which economic and military statistics
were seen, and hence the perception which was being created or reinforced.
Given the importance of generating impressions of power, it is with some
interest that Segal should conclude his essay on ‘Does China Matter?’, with the
following observation: “. . . until China is cut down to size in Western
imaginations and treated more like a Brazil or an India, the West stands little
chance of sustaining a coherent and long-term policy toward it” (p. 36,
emphasis added).
In choosing India as an example of a lesser power with which China should
compare, a great deal is revealed about perceptions of India. While both China
and India, as large but poor nations, could legitimately be painted as middle
powers, they could equally be considered in the category of great powers -
particularly from a Southern hemisphere and equatorial point of view. In the
Western Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, greatness resides in Japan, China
and India. Yet India, in terms of dominant Western (Northern hemisphere)
perception, surely suffers from the opposite condition of China. Rather than
being an inflated power, it is in all probability a decidedly deflated power. Why
might this be so? As I have written elsewhere:
. . . India is not well understood by the rest of the world. Its preoccupations are not
the world’s preoccupations. Neither rivalry with Pakistan in foreign relations nor the
complexity of Indian socio-political affairs internally are international staples.
. . . China is also not generally well understood, but the world is acutely aware of it.
Indeed China itself ranks as a global preoccupation. (Dellios, 1999:5)
‘Is it better to be feared than loved if you cannot be both?’
India appears to be underestimated as a potential great power, largely because
it fails to inspire fear, awe or avariciousness in the world beyond. (These are typical
testing grounds in the outer frames of a mandala.) China, by comparison, has
succeeded. Chinese military ambition (as distinct from capability), the strength
of Chinese culture, and the much touted market of a billion people, have
captivated the global imagination. Even China’s critics are at their harshest
when discussing human rights issues, Tibet and Taiwan. India, by comparison,
is not feared for being the world’s biggest democracy or having a strong
computer software industry. Its nuclear weapons status as of 1998 has not
primarily inspired fear, but condemnation or ridicule for perceived ‘gung-ho’
behaviour. In short, where China is perhaps unreasonably feared, given its lack
as FDI when entering via Hong Kong. The purpose of this ploy is to qualify for tax concessions
(see Segal, 1999: 28).
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of capability or even sufficiently demonstrated intent, India is not feared
enough. And while that famed Florentine strategist, Nicholi Machiavelli (1469-
1527), thought it was better to be both loved and feared, he recognised both do
not always coincide, and that human experience has taught that it is safer to be
feared if a prince (in current times, a state) is to be influential. Hence the
following words of caution have been proffered:
. . . it is far better to be feared than loved if you cannot be both. . . . The bond of
love is one which men, wretched creatures that they are, break when it is to their
advantage to do so; but fear is strengthened by a dread of punishment which is
always effective.
. . . The prince must nonetheless make himself feared in such a way that, if he is not
loved, at least he escapes being hated. For fear is quite compatible with the absence
of hatred; . . . [and with the presence of respect].
. . . So, on this question of being loved or feared, I conclude that since some men
love as they please but fear when the prince pleases, a wise prince would rely on
what he controls, not on what he cannot control. (Machiavelli, The Prince: XVII).
Machiavelli’s thinking was formulated within the competitive political climate
of Renaissance Italy, but the power politics which he studied are of universal
import. Forms of political realism, or realpolitik, may be recognised from
European antiquity (Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War) through to
diverse cultural settings, including Chinese legalist and Indian Kautilyan
traditions.5 ‘Realism’ is a political currency with which the world is long
acquainted and which in many respects still holds sway unto the current era.
The power of attraction
That which is feared often inspires awe, and not only in its power of
punishment but also in its cultural identity. American culture may be said to be
as powerful and awesome as its fighter jets; oftentimes it is just as feared. China
has long used culture as a defining feature of civilisation and state strength. In
Reischauer and Fairbank’s (1970) apt summation, the “Chinese state was
regarded as coterminous with Chinese culture” (p. 293). The Middle Kingdom’s
traditional tributary system of international relations was based on the notion
of cultural superiority. Lesser nations would pay tribute to the Chinese
emperor in an atmosphere of elaborate ritual. That ‘barbarians’ represented
5 Greek historian Thucydides (460-c. 400 BC) is famed for his history of the Peloponnesian War,
which he attributed to threat perception and power politics. Chinese legalism refers to a school
of classical thought which, when put into practice, brought about the unification of China in 221
BC. It supported standardisation, centralisation, severe punishments, and the effectiveness of
military power. In China, the first dynasty’s legalist rule was thought to be so severe as to sow
the seeds of its own downfall. In India, during the Mauryan era, the renouned strategist
Kautilya (4th century BC), through the Arthasastra (Book of the State), developed a complex
system of international relations based on relationships of power.
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China’s uncivilised ‘other’ is testimony to the important place accorded to
culture in Chinese constructions of power.
Culture - and with it, religion - may be seen as the positive face of power. It is
the ‘carrot’ to attract love and respect, as distinct from the ‘stick’, or negative
face of power, which is used to compel or deter through coercion. The ‘stick’,
while inducing fear, can also lead to hatred. Hatred, as Machiavelli warned, is a
condition the astute ruler must avoid when deploying the power of fear.
Organised hatred of the government may lead to rebellion within, and justify
intervention from without. History, including that of the late 20th century, has
furnished abundant examples of this. Thus there are pragmatic and not only
moral reasons for the avoidance of tyranny. The Arthasastra or Book of the State
from India’s Mauryan empire concurred when it stated: “a king of unrighteous
character and of vicious habits will, though he is an emperor, fall prey either to
the fury of his own subjects or to that of his enemies” (Kautilya, 1:259). Chinese
political philosophy is a ready source of warnings against tyranny as, for
example, found in the Mencius:
Confucius said: ‘There are but two ways to follow, that of humanity and that of
inhumanity.’ A ruler who oppresses his people to the extreme will himself be slain
and his kingdom will perish. If he oppresses not to the extreme, even then his life
will be in danger and his kingdom will be weakened. (Mencius, 4A:2 in Chan,
1963:73)
Not only was humane government to be practised within the state, but ‘the
power of attraction’ was held in high esteem in traditional Chinese foreign
policy. To quote China’s pre-eminent Master, Confucius, when asked about
government: “Ensure those who are near are pleased and those who are far
away are attracted” (Analects, XIII:16). Irrespective of the ethical reasons for
humane government (and these figured prominently in Confucianism), Chinese
deployment of culture was of strategic import. Through the principle of laihua,
which means ‘come and be transformed’, China’s modus operandi as a state was
to attract the world rather than conquer it. This meant that the ‘barbarian’
tribute bearers to the Chinese capital were represented as being drawn to
civilisation (the mandala centre), not cowed into submission. While there is little
to link Machiavelli to Confucius philosophically, it is worth mentioning
Machiavelli’s viewpoint on this matter, and perhaps in doing so linking ethics
to pragmatism, like yin to yang, dharma to artha (soft and hard power, ethical
and material power). Machiavelli regarded propaganda as one of “two
principal instruments at the disposal of the prince” (Jones 1969:29), the other
being force. He considered religion to be a prime propaganda technique.
“Whoever reads Roman history attentively,” Machiavelli wrote in the
Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius (Vol. II, Bk. I), “will see in how
great a degree religion served in the command of the armies, in uniting the
people and keeping them well conducted, and in covering the wicked with
shame” (Jones, 1969:31). The propaganda power of religion was also used
effectively against the Romans, as evidenced by the rebellious Christians.
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Present-day secular India is well aware of the political potency of religion.
‘Partition’ and ‘demolition’ are politically-charged terms in Indian discourse.6
‘Partition’ - the division of British India into a secular state with a Hindu
majority (India) and an Islamic state with a Muslim majority (Pakistan) - was
accompanied by much bloodshed (at least 500,000 perished) and bitterness as
the opposing religious groups fought during the mass exodus to their
respective states. ‘Demolition’ was also accompanied by inter-communal
violence - though not on the scale of partition - when Hindu fanatics tore down
a 16th century mosque in Ayodhya in 1992. The fanatics believed that the
mosque, called the Babri Masjid, had been built by the founder of the Moghul
dynasty on the birthsite of Lord Ram. China, too, is no stranger to the pitfalls of
religiously-based movements. Its banning of, and police action against, the
Falun Gong sect provides only the latest example of the Chinese state versus
religious cult politics - the most famous being the ‘Boxer Rebellion’ during the
Qing dynasty.
But to return to the awe-generating potential of culture, and China’s refinement
of the art, there is yet another power element to which it is related. In addition
to tribute relations equating with a symbolic submission to civilisation (China),
this form of traditional foreign policy which China practised also entailed
attractive rewards, both in terms of trade opportunities and the conditions of
peace in which they could be pursued. Here the ‘barbarian’s’ avariciousness
comes into play.
The power of greed
Gerald Segal, in his abovementioned essay questioning China’s credentials as a
great power, speculated that “China is better understood as a theoretical power
- a country that has promised to deliver for much of the last 150 years but has
consistently disappointed” (p. 24). It is true that the vast Chinese market has
not fully materialised, largely because it has not been fully developed. Poverty
prevented a large proportion of the Chinese population from becoming
consumers - except for opium, owing to 19th century British commercial
avarice and political expedience. There were also restrictive Chinese
government policies on trade when it was demanded by the ‘foreign devils’ as
a right, rather than conferred as a consequence of proper tributary relations.
Indeed it was an imbalance of trade, in China’s favour, that led the British to
resort to the sale of opium, grown in India, to open the China market. When
they could not succeed by subversive means, because of a concerted
clampdown on the illegal opium trade, the British imperialists openly
employed force. This became known as ‘gunboat diplomacy’ during the Opium
Wars of 1842 and 1860.
China’s subjugation to British trade interests demonstrates the power of greed
when it is turned against you. Beijing has learnt this lesson well and opened up,
6 As evident in the diversely-sourced essays found in Silvers and Epstein, 2000, for example.
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on its own terms, the same treaty ports - as well as many other areas - more
than a century after the Opium Wars. Long prized for its luxury consumer
products that included silk, tea, and porcelain, China is now courted once again
by business interests the world over. Because of the much celebrated China
market, Beijing is exempt from the more censorious extremes of American and
allied foreign policy. Even for the USA, the celebrated ‘land of the free’,
ideology is not the sole - nor always the primary - ‘criterion of truth’. The
United States and India, the world’s two largest democracies, have seen little of
each other during the Cold War when strategic alignment held higher value as
an indicator of worth than constitutional, freely elected, government. Like
China, the United States well understands the language of power - markets,
military might and global diplomatic impact.
Given the weight of American business and stability-promoting interests,
neither democratic Taiwan nor Tibet as an international cause celebre can sway
Washington into taking punitive action against China. NATO’s use of force in
Kosovo in 1999 is unlikely to be replicated in the Strait of Taiwan or in the
Himalayan plateau, let alone across the less publicised region of Xinjiang from
which calls for an independent ‘East Turkistan’ issue. Beijing acts like a beacon
to international investors, particularly with its recent admission to WTO. It
controls a credible and constantly modernising nuclear arsenal, as well as the
world’s largest armed force. While Beijing reserves its smiles for investors, it
readily displays a belligerent attitude as the occasion demands, particularly on
issues of sovereignty.
China’s flexibility of forces
In a world which has become far more interdependent (the integrating function
of mandala) but no less wedded to power as an exclusive value - that is, “Since
one’s own power is relative to others’ lack of it, the pursuit of power for oneself
implies the denial of power to others” (Jones, 1969:26) - finding one’s preferred
place in the hierarchy involves skills relevant to both conditions (becoming
more integrated as one travels to the centre in the mandala but also
manipulating the demons of human appetites). Power as a common value - “in
the sense it could be shared without loss” (ibid) - refers here to the (productive)
economic and cultural power of attraction (laihua). It also includes China’s
much publicised ‘strategic partnerships’ with various countries, including the
USA and Russia. These are fluid partnerships of power rather than entrenched
struggles for power that characterised 19th century diplomacy and 20th century
Cold War politics. ‘Strategic partnerships’ may prove to represent a shrewd
diplomatic device for defusing a competitor’s exclusive pursuit of power.
Power as a common value accords with global interdependence. However, the
quest for a preponderance of power characterises the power-maximising
activities of nations wishing to reduce their vulnerabilities and maintain a
credible capacity to enforce claims or threaten punishment when interests are
compromised.
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In the light of the above, China may be said to have performed its fear-inducing
and awe-inspiring - not to mention, greed-invoking - role rather better than
India. Western ‘realism’ may well be misreading both centralised, ‘Communist’
China (which is popularised as a potential threat to the established order), and
democratic, ‘chaotic’ India (which is not). In turn, Beijing and New Delhi may
also have only themselves to congratulate or blame, as the case may be, for
misleading the West and possibly themselves. In a word, neither China nor
India is sufficiently appreciated for its inherent capacities. Their current
mandalas are not fully formed. In China, whatever the appearance, power no
longer grows out of ‘the barrel of a gun’.7 Indeed, the military is among the
least of China’s assets - unless it is deployed to extramilitary ends - and can be
among its worst enemies if it is not.
By this is meant that Chinese military power should not be used or threatened
to be used in any situation which could advance the image of China as a brutal
power,8 as in case of Taiwan’s reunification or in an internal security role, lest
China’s campaign of economic and cultural attraction (a contemporary version
of laihua) turns to repulsion. This, of course, occurred most vividly in response
to the use of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) against students in
Tiananmen Square in June 1989. Military power is best used when held in
abeyance as a deterrent to aggression or as psychological ballast for advancing
its diplomacy - in other words, being able to negotiate from a position of
strength. If we are to understand that, in Henry Kissinger’s words, “the United
States is the only superpower in only one field of activity, and that is the
military” (Kissinger, 1998:2), then China has a great deal of room to maneuver.
With its portfolio of forces, including economic attraction and partnership
diplomacy (especially in US President Bush’s ‘war against terrorism’9), it can
set out to modify US behaviour, and not only compete in kind - that is,
militarily.
Avoidance of outright military competition will save China money and ‘face’,
in that its inadequacies will not be under constant scrutiny. If China attempted
to match the US, the cost would be prohibitive. Avoidance of even the
appearance of an arms race will also save it from continued suspicion of its
intentions. Meanwhile, the psychological ballast of credible defence capability
must be maintained - especially in the conventional weapons sector. Undue
reliance on the nuclear threat is fraught with the risk of (a) use in the event that
deterrence fails and conventional forces are inadequate; (b) non-use and hence
capitulation (like the Cuban missile crisis when the Soviet Union backed down
in the face of US nuclear threats); and (c) provoking or providing a pretext for US
7 A famous Mao dictum, which was included in the Little Red Book, was that ‘political power
grows out of the barrel of the gun’. Its historical context was that the Chinese Communist Party
needed its army to win the revolutionary war; but the army was expected to obey the party and
not vice-versa.
8 For example, former British Ambassador to China, Sir Percy Craddock, is quoted in
MacFarquhar (2000:165) as describing the Chinese as ‘thugs’.
9 This theme is developed in Dellios and Field (2002).
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deployment of missile defence systems. This would considerably diminish
China’s nuclear credibility (see the International Institute for Strategic Studies
1999a, 1999b).
China’s geostrategic advantage is that it is the largest and always has been the
largest polity in East Asia, much of which came under its suzerainty for two
millennia. This, coupled with the China’s attractiveness to futurists and
optimists who invest in emerging world orders, provide the People’s Republic
with sufficient flexibility to arrange its power portfolio as circumstances
demand. When Mao Zedong addressed the question of how does a weak army
fight a strong one, his answer then has not lost any of its salience. The answer
was to gain psychological ascendancy over the opponent so as to minimise his
comparative advantage in material power. At the time, Mao’s strategy was
called People’s War and involved guerilla tactics - “The enemy advances, we
retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy
retreats, we pursue” (Mao, 1966). As I have written elsewhere: “Such guerilla
tactics naturally favour fluid rather than fixed battle lines. The purpose is to
avoid engaging the enemy force on its own self-serving terms - an example of
the wider principle of denying the adversary its concepts of warfare” (Dellios,
1989:13).
China has a rich and robust history of strategic endeavour. Mao, like Confucius,
was a creative transmitter of tradition, mining China’s cultural resources for
answers to contemporary predicaments. It is said that nothing is wasted in
China. Its use of history and culture attests to this. In questions of war and
peace, Mao revived such classical strategists as Sunzi, just as Confucius
addressed the militarism of his times by invoking the humane way of the sages.
China has a flexible and diverse range of power factors at its disposal. Because
these are often ‘value added’ by circumstance or convergence with one another,
they are not readily measured. However, it would be unwise to underestimate
this form of power while overestimating the significance of arms acquisition
programs and forays into the South China Sea.
India’s Diversionary Power
India’s greatness lies in its wide-ranging talents for losing itself in the world
and finding its presence in almost any philosophy, religion and social
condition, while retaining the recognisable rasa or flavour of ‘Indian’
civilisation.
All the convergent influences of the world run through this society: Hindu, Moslem,
Christian, secular; Stalinist, liberal, Maoist, democratic socialist, Ghandian. There is
not a thought in the West or East that is not active in some Indian mind. (Historian
E. P. Thompson quoted in Sen, 2000: 101)
India’s capacities are underestimated in terms of their diversionary power; it is
therefore a case of watch what India says, not what it does. What is India
saying in what it is doing? Interpreting India, and hence its potentialities, is
Rosita Dellios China and India: New Mandalas of Power
14
perhaps even more important than interpreting China which is, ironically for a
relatively secretive polity, more revealing of itself. China’s concerns are highly
focused: domestic economic reform; vigilance against American containment;
and defence of Westphalian sovereignty to prevent interference in the upkeep
and pursuit of Chinese state unity.10 China’s preoccupations read like a career
path to great power status.
India, by comparison, is more evocative in its approach to the conduct of state
affairs. For example, the otherwise fear- and awe-inducing act of nuclearisation
is verbally juxtaposed with smiling Buddhic serenity. India’s civilisational
greatness, the birthplace of Buddhism and home of Hinduism, was brought
home to the modern world with a ‘bang rather than a whimper’, to borrow
from T. S. Elliot’s suitably titled poem, The Wasteland. Upon the testing of
India’s nuclear device in 1974, its success was conveyed to Indira Gandhi, the
then prime minister, with the code term: ‘Buddha is smiling’. That test was
conducted on Buddha Poornima Day (or Wesak, Buddha’s birthday). On the
24th anniversary of the first test came another. It was codenamed, ‘Buddha
smiles again’. One scientist, on witnessing the underground explosion of three
nuclear devices was reported in India Today (May 1998) as saying: “I can now
believe stories of Lord Krishna lifting a hill” (in Roy, 2000:xvii). The 1974 test
had been described as a peaceful explosion. Its sequel in 1998 came with a
government assurance that India continued to be “committed to the global
elimination of nuclear weapons” (Deccan Herald, 1998). In this regard, it is ironic
that among the official reasons given for the test was ‘exposing Western
hypocrisy’.
The 1998 test was presided over by a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Hindu
nationalist prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who was politically embattled
at the time - just as Indira Ghandi had been in 1974. As Pankaj Mishra
(2000:228) observed: “India’s first nuclear test in 1974 came in handy for Indira
Gandhi when she was facing a crippling railway strike (the first of the political
challenges that eventually led her to suspend civil rights in 1975).” The second
demonstration of nuclear power gave a new lease of political life to Vajpayee,
just as the first had done so for Mrs Gandhi: “The tests removed a feeling of
‘national weakness’ among Indians, a BJP spokesman said. This is why criticism
of the Prime Minister virtually ceased for a while after the tests: he was now
praised, even by his recent opponents, for being courageous and decisive . . .”
(Mishra, 2000:231). Indian public acclaim for heroic deeds on the part of its
leaders links into god-king and mother-goddess attributes. Indeed, Pankaj
Mishra (2000:238) relates how after India’s defeat of Pakistan in 1971, Indira
Ghandi was hailed as the Hindu goddess Durga, consort of Shiva. The tale of a
BJP leader, L. K. Advani, dressing up like Lord Rama and being driven in a
10 Thus, for example, in 1992, China passed legislation declaring sovereignty over the disputed
Spratly, Paracel and Diaoytai (or Senkaku) island groups and also reserved the right - as it did
with Taiwan - to use military force to assert its claims.
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Toyota disguised as a chariot, is another instance of the power of mythic
metaphor in Indian politics.
Former Indian prime minister, P. V. Narasimha Rao, in his book, The Insider
(1998), argues that Indian politics are essentially feudal. “Neither the
democratic nor the federal principle had taken root to supplant the feudal ethos
. . . [of] past centuries; the concept of kingship . . . was ingrained in the
collective consciousness. . . . Democracy in action at best consisted of the
question: Who should reign?” (quoted in Mishra, 2000:240).
If - to take this metaphor further - emperors and mandarins, albeit Communist,
still rule in China, and divine monarchs rein in India through elections, what of
the lands they govern? China is still called Zhongguo (the Middle Kingdom) in
Chinese. The idea of a middle kingdom pertained not only to the centre of
civilisation, surrounded by ‘barbarians’, but also to the country of equilibrium.
As for India, its psycho-strategic dispositions are well revealed by the
American specialist on South Asia, Stephen Cohen. Referring to the partition of
post-independence India, he observed that it “broke up the strategic unity of
the subcontinent that - albeit intermittently - goes back 2000 years to the first
Mauryan Empire” (Cohen, 1993). A united India would mean a geographic
reach from the Persian Gulf to Southeast Asia and a diplomatic gravity to rival
China’s (ibid.). Add to continental unity, a maritime power projection across the
Indian Ocean, and India could have been much greater than it is in the
hierarchy of nations - perhaps second or third after the United States. K. M.
Panikkar’s seminal work, India and the Indian Ocean, first published in 1945,
presents the case for control of the seas as follows:
During its five thousand years of history, India like China has been conquered many
time by invasions from the land side. But in the case of both, such conquests,
though they led to temporary convulsions, only ended in the assimilation of the
conqueror in the general pattern of the local civilisation.
Control from the side of the sea is different. It operates as a stranglehold especially
when, as in the case of India, as a result of geographical factors, the country’s
prosperity is dependent almost exclusively on sea trade. . . .
. . . For sea trade no country is so centrally situated. . . . While to other countries,
the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is the vital
sea. Her life lines are concentrated in that area. (Panikkar, 1962: 84-5)
With the 21st century underway, India as a great sea power has not come to
pass. While not without progress, India’s new naval doctrine which calls for
‘blue water’ capability by 2010, is judged overly ambitions to fund within such
a short timeframe (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000b).
Similarly, India’s August 1999 Draft Nuclear Doctrine would require, according
to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (ibid.), “about $500 million
annually over the next decade for even a minimal version” of the envisaged
strategic force. India’s ambitions, it seems, are out of reach of its capabilities.
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But ambition harnessed to a China-like determination to accomplish serious
reform tasks, taps India’s diversionary power. Shiva’s dance does not have to
lead to destruction - unless it is the destruction of petty political vanities. If
China seeks its equilibrium between Heaven and Earth, yin and yang, dharma
and artha; India is precariously balanced between the gods and the void. High-
tech exit strategies from poverty present themselves on the one hand, the forces
of ‘partition’ and ‘demolition’ menace on the other.
Chinese premier, Zhu Rongji, understood the condition well when he famously
adhered to the view that China must crash or crash-through in implementing
its reforms. ‘Crash’ could entail national fragmentation. This is no idle
speculation for either China or India in view of the ease nowadays with which
nations fall, fragment or force their entrenched leaderships from office. The
weight of restive publics with heightened expectations needs to be borne
through ever more enterprising and transmodern means. In other words it is a
question of how to globalise in relation to the ‘centre’.
How might this question be approached in mandala terms? Hall and Ames
(1995) provide some guiding insights in their discussion of Chinese aesthetics:
Among the Chinese, circles and squares have been dominated not by their
peripheries but by their centres. It is not the bounded circle or the square one is apt
to meet in Chinese art, literature, or philosophy, but the “radial” circle and the
“nested” square which extend themselves ever outward from their centres. The
Chinese claim that the world is but “the ten thousand things” bears little suggestion
that it is a bounded or a boundable whole. Such a world is a set of foci from which
relatedness to what at the moment is deemed “centre” may be negotiated. (Hall and
Ames, 1995:xxii)
China and India are great powers insofar as they concentrate on their
civilisational centres - their historic regard for how to become human and thus
enlightened - rather than their peripheries which can entrap them into narrow
concerns for boundaries and borders. In any case, these are being outgrown.
Happily, the ‘borderless world’ has become a cliché of our present digital age.
New geopolitical mandalas of power are positioned to extend outwards into this
borderless world from ancient centres of power. Rather than committing
cultural suicide in order to survive the demands of globalisation and middle
class/middle power values, these ancient centres of civilisation understand
how to be great in the developed human sense. Their confidence should assist
both their own people and the rest of the world to integrate the 21st century’s
diverse globalisation.
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